Joe Horton argues that partial aggregation yields unacceptable verdicts in cases with risk and multiple decisions. I begin by showing that Horton's challenge does not depend on risk, since exactly similar arguments apply to riskless cases. The underlying conflict Horton exposes is between partial aggregation and certain principles of diachronic choice.

I then provide two arguments against these diachronic principles: (i) they conflict with intuitions about parity, prerogatives, and cyclical preferences, and (ii) they rely on an odd assumption about diachronic choice. Finally, I offer an explanation, on behalf of partial aggregation, for why these diachronic principles fail.

The numbers often bear on what we ought to do, but sometimes the numbers seem irrelevant. To accommodate these judgments, we seem forced to accept both aggregative and non-aggregative dimensions of morality. This paper proposes, instead, a theory that explains these judgments without aggregation.

Many of us have both personal and altruistic aims. Some of us face risky processes whose outcomes vary dramatically along certain dimensions. To take one fanciful possibility, someone might pursue a career in academia (low hours, low pay) with the fallback option of working in corporate law (brutal hours, high pay). This paper considers whether, in such cases, we can better advance both our personal and altruistic aims by planning to give “counterfactually.”